Okay - Having listened to the latest edition of
This American Life -
Another Frightening Show About the Economy, it's hard to know where to begin.
Alex Blumberg and NPR's Adam Davidson do a masterful job of following the food chain of the current mess.
Their previous installment,
The Giant Pool of Money, starts with minnows - the sub-prime mortgages - and works their way up to the bigger fish: the Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs.
The theme is that money put at risk in bad mortgages is leveraged many times over so that ever increasing amounts of capital are put at risk. As the title of its sequel suggests, this is a frightening show about the economy.
That same sequel's title is a vast understatement of itself. This show is not frightening, its much worse than that.
To extend the food chain metaphor, we move up from the bigger fish and finally arrive at the killer whales of this mess:
Credit Default Swaps.
Now, Credit Default Swaps are hard to understand by design. I'm not sure I could understand any of their detail - but I've a pretty good head for exploiting a system of rules.
When you hear the basics of default swaps, it's hard to believe anyone thought this was a good idea. Or, to be fair, that these were a complete good idea. I'd say its about a fourth of a good idea. You invest in something that you're worried about, and you pay someone a small amount of fees every year to reimburse your investment in case of disaster.
A new product, a new stream of revenue, and encouragement for further investement. Win, win, win.
Well, here are three missing pieces as I understand it:
1) There is no requirement that the person selling the swap has the money to pay up.
2) A swap can be bought by parties unconnected to the transaction the swap is protecting.
3) There is no requirement that parties in a swap disclose the transaction.
The obvious exploit in this setup is that companies can sell more than they can cover - which happened.
But
TAL's show points out an even more troubling exploit - based on that second item. A third party can buy a default swap on a security that isn't theirs.
It's like buying life insurance from the Big Life Company on somebody you don't know, who you just found out has Ebola. You tell your friends and soon everybody's buying insurance on this guy. As soon as the insurers get wind of this, they start to raise the rates of new insurance.
If insurance were swaps, you wouldn't have to have the money to back the payout - so
you could start selling insurance on Ebola-guy - at the newly inflated rates.
You're paying out less than your being paid, so you make money as long as this guy keeps breathing.
And IF he dies - your insurance pays you. You use that payout to pay the people you sold insurance to, and you pocket the premium difference you'd collected before he croaked.
It nets out.
But, then suppose he dies and Big Life suddenly goes bankrupt on sub-prime securities. You get no money, and you're on the hook for the insurance you sold to other people.
Oops.
You go under - and now some of your insureds had setups just like you did. They were counting on you paying out so they could pay out.
Double Oops.
And so on.
That third item - The fact that we don't know who sold swaps to who and in what amounts - is the really terrifying aspect of this.
Nobody has a clear picture of how many of these chain reactions are out there- waiting to go off the next time a bank goes under.
TAL has done us all a huge service pointing this out - but also pointing out that this was a bipartisan disaster. I haven't managed to find the vote count for the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, but it was passed overwhelmingly by the Senate back in 2000.
It's convenient to blame Phil Gramm (he did push the bill and bring it to the floor), but a can't-be-bothered Congress voted to not regulate credit default swaps, and now we're all coming up short.