Feeling a Bit Irish...

(Via CJR)

CJR's Ryan Chittum highlights a WSJ story about the financial ruin of Ireland.

See if any parts of this sound familiar:

September 2008

The party ended in 2008, when the property bubble popped and the global economy tipped into recession. The government remained optimistic; an internal finance-department memo concluded in May that the Irish banking system was "sound and robust based on all key indicators of financial health."

Yet by September, Irish banks were struggling to borrow quick cash for daily expenses. The government thought they faced a classic liquidity squeeze. Ireland—whose hands-off regulator had assigned just three examiners to two major banks—didn't recognize the deeper problem: Banks had made too many bad loans, whose defaults would leave the lenders insolvent.

December 2008

[PricewaterhouseCoopers, on behalf of the Irish government] was sent to look at the banks' books. It found defaults creeping up. Still, banks insisted they could soldier on unaided. In December meetings with bankers in the fifth-floor boardroom of Ireland's debt agency, the government resolved to act.

"It's not credible that you don't need equity," John Corrigan, the agency's chief, snapped. "You're taking capital. That's it."

March 2009

[Irish Finance Minister] Mr. Lenihan met with advisers to bat around remedies. None sounded promising. He turned to Peter Bacon, an economist he'd hired a week earlier, who shocked the crowded room with a figure far bigger than the few billion Ireland had spent. The banks made more than €150 billion of potentially toxic property and land loans, he said. "That's the extent of your problem."

Mr. Bacon suggested the government buy loans from the banks at discounted prices, effectively handing them cash and easing doubts about their viability. By insisting on steep discounts, Ireland would be less likely to lose money on the purchases. On the flip side, bargain prices would trigger losses at the banks—which the government would probably have to patch with more capital. The taxpayer would foot the bill either way, but at least Ireland would understand how big it was.

The approach "has the merit of certainty and clarity," Mr. Bacon argued. But, he added, it would only work if "the projection of the extent of impairment is accurate in the first place."

It wasn't.

and

In early 2010, Mr. McDonagh's team [working for the Irish debt agency] got a rude surprise upon diving into the books [of Irish banks].

"We opened it up and said, 'Oh, my God,"' Mr. McDonagh said in an interview. "What they are telling us is not the reality."

The banks had said they had loaned 77% of the value of a property, on average. The other 23%, put up by the borrower, would cushion a default.

The NAMA teams found that banks often piled on "equity releases" that amounted to lending out 100% of the value, and left them fully responsible in a default.

Worse, much of the collateral was shaky. Several times, a developer pledged future profits on other ventures. Many loans were riddled with flawed documentation, leaving banks without solid legal rights to the property they had believed was backing up the loans.

and then

"The detailed information that has emerged from the banks in the course of the NAMA process is truly shocking," Mr. Lenihan told lawmakers. But, he added, "we now know the extent of the losses in our banks....This certainty will further boost international confidence in our ability to recover."

He was wrong.

...

The total capital injected into banks by the government so far: €34 billion, with at least another €12 billion on the way. The bailouts mean Ireland will run a government deficit equal to 32% of its gross domestic product, the highest figure ever in any euro-zone country. Skeptics say a still-sinking property market will next sour residential mortgages, inflating the government tab even more.

Ye gods.